Ismaili Constitution 2025 - First signed by Shah Rahim Aga Khan V

Ismaili Constitution, Institutional and Historical docs
mahebubchatur
Posts: 1159
Joined: Mon Jan 13, 2014 7:01 pm

Ismaili Constitution 2025 - First signed by Shah Rahim Aga Khan V

Post by mahebubchatur »

THE ISMAILI CONSTITUTION 2025
Educational Briefing Paper

Imamat, the Imam, the Diwan of the Ismaili Imamat
and the Jamat — Jamat First

In light of the Presentation by Vazir Mahmood H. Ahmed - the Ismaili Constitutional and Legal Framework

⸻

The Central Question

What precisely is the constitutional relationship between the Imam, the Imamat, the Constitution, the Diwan of the Ismaili Imamat, the institutions and the Jamat — and how are these relationships to be understood, when the Constitution and the Farmans are to be read and understood together?

The Central Proposition

“This briefing supports an assertive but constitutionally grounded proposition: “the Jamat first.” Which does not mean Jamat alone or Jamat to the exclusion of others. It means the Jamat is at the heart of the constitutional purpose, while its service is inherently inclusive of and beneficial to wider communities”

Introduction
In his presentation entitled “The Ismaili Constitution: 2025 — Continuity, Evolution and the Future,” Vazir Mahmood H. Ahmed presented a slide concerning “The Diwan” and described it in the following terms:

The Diwan
* Supranational role of the Ismaili Imamat
* Uniquely provides functional sovereignty rooted in the guiding authority of the Imamat, not in territory
* Recognised by the State of Portugal through a treaty acknowledging Imamat’s juridical personality (June 2016)
* Formally established by an Imamat Instrument (July 2018)
* Serves as the Imamat’s global headquarters, administrative centre, and locus of engagement in international affairs

He then refers to Article 4 of the 2025 Constitution:

4.1 In accordance with inherent Imamat authority, historical right and ancestral tradition, Mawlana Hazar Imam may designate one or more Seats of the Ismaili Imamat, for such purpose and for such duration as Mawlana Hazar Imam may determine.

4.2 The existing Seat, known as the Diwan of the Ismaili Imamat as more particularly described in the First Schedule, acts as a locus for:

(a) its engagement with the Jamat;

(b) its wider institutional interactions, diplomatic relations and discourse;

(c) its endeavours to foster human flourishing; and

(d) such other purposes as Mawlana Hazar Imam may determine.

The slide raises an important constitutional question:

What precisely is the relationship between the Imam, the Imamat, the Constitution and the Diwan?

A careful examination of the primary legal instruments suggests that these concepts should be distinguished rather than merged.

Once that distinction is made, the constitutional architecture becomes considerably clearer.

⸻

PART I — THE IMAMAT, THE IMAM AND THE DIWAN

1. What Mahmood H. Ahmed’s Presentation Gets Right

The presentation correctly identifies the Diwan as the Seat of the Ismaili Imamat and places it within the wider international institutional role of the Imamat.

The Portuguese legal framework is particularly important.
In the 2009 Agreement between the Portuguese Republic and the Ismaili Imamat, Portugal recognised the legal personality of the Ismaili Imamat. The Agreement was signed in Lisbon on 8 May 2009 and approved by the Portuguese Parliament in 2010. (Diário da República)

The subsequent 2015 Agreement concerning the establishment of the Seat in Portugal expressly recalled that 2009 recognition and defined:
* the Ismaili Imamat as a legal entity, meaning the institution or office of the Imam;
* the Imam as the person embodying the Ismaili Imamat at any given time in history; and
* the Seat as the global head office of the Ismaili Imamat. (Diário da República)

The 2015 Agreement further states that Portugal recognises the legal personality and capacity of the Ismaili Imamat to act in international relations. It establishes privileges, immunities and facilities in connection with the official functions of the Imamat, the Imam and the Seat. (Diário da República)

On 11 July 2018, Mawlana Hazar Imam designated the Henrique de Mendonça Palace in Lisbon as the Seat of the Ismaili Imamat and declared that it be known as the Diwan of the Ismaili Imamat. (The Ismaili Imamat)

The fundamental institutional proposition in Mahmood H. Ahmed’s presentation is therefore supported.

The terminology, however, requires greater precision.

⸻

2. The Diwan Is Not the Juridical Entity
The most important distinction is this:

The Diwan is not the juridical personality recognised by Portugal.

The 2015 Agreement defines the Ismaili Imamat as the legal entity and separately defines the Seat as its global head office. (Diário da República)

Accordingly:

Ismaili Imamat
= the recognised juridical institution / office of the Imam

Imam
= the person embodying the Imamat at a given point in history

Diwan
= the designated Seat / global headquarters of the Imamat
This distinction is legally significant.

It would therefore be inaccurate to describe the Diwan itself as the legal entity recognised by Portugal.

The more precise formulation is:
Portugal recognised the juridical personality of the Ismaili Imamat, while the Diwan is the designated Seat and global headquarters of that Imamat.


⸻


3. The Imam and the Imamat Are Distinguishable, but Not Simply Separate
It would likewise be misleading to describe the Imam and the Imamat as completely separate entities in the ordinary corporate sense.
The Portuguese treaty deliberately establishes a more particular relationship.
The 2015 Agreement defines the Ismaili Imamat as:
“the institution or office of the Imam”
and defines the Imam as:
“embodying the Ismaili Imamat at any given time in history.” (Diário da República)
This provides an important distinction between:

The Imam
The living person who, according to Ismaili doctrine and the recognised customary succession, holds the office of the Imam.

The Imamat
The enduring institution or office of the Imam.

The Diwan
The designated Seat through which the enduring institution operates internationally.

Thus:

The Imam embodies the Imamat; the Imamat is the enduring institution or office; and the Diwan is its designated Seat.

This formulation avoids both extremes:
* treating the Imam and Imamat as exactly the same legal concept; or
* treating them as wholly unrelated legal entities.


⸻


4. The Constitution Does Not Create the Imam’s Authority
This is perhaps the most important constitutional distinction.

The constitutional framework proceeds from the authority of the Imam rather than creating that authority.

The historical constitutional text expressly recognised the Imam’s authority over religious and Jamati matters and his authority to confer, amend and interpret the Constitution and establish institutions and offices. (Ismaili.net)

The publicly reproduced opening of the 11 February 2025 constitutional instrument similarly records that the Constitution was ordained by Mawlana Hazar Imam in the exercise of the authority vested in him and that the Constitution would govern Shia Imami Ismaili Muslims wherever they may be. (Ismaili Forum)

The sequence is therefore:
Imam’s authority → Constitution ordained by the Imam → constitutional governance of the Jamat

The Constitution should therefore not be treated as the source of the Imam’s religious authority.

That distinction is fundamental to understanding the constitutional architecture.


⸻


5. The Theological and Institutional Distinction
For purposes of clarity, three connected but different concepts should be distinguished.

A. The Imam — the person
The Imam is the individual who holds the hereditary office of the Imamat.
Within Ismaili belief, the Imam’s authority is rooted in the continuing hereditary Imamat and the doctrine of succession through Nass.
That is a matter of Ismaili faith and doctrine.

B. The Imamat — the enduring institution
The Imamat is not simply the personal identity of one individual.
The Portuguese legal definition is particularly useful because it describes the Imamat as the institution or office of the Imam, while describing the Imam as the person embodying that institution at a particular point in history. (Diário da República)
Thus the institution endures through succession even though the individual Imam changes.

C. The Constitution — the Imam-ordained instrument
The Constitution is an instrument ordained by the Imam for the worldwide Jamat.
It establishes a framework through which the Jamat is organised and governed.
It therefore belongs to the constitutional expression of the Imam’s authority rather than being the source of that authority.


⸻


6. Portuguese Recognition Adds a Separate Legal Dimension

The religious authority of the Imam and the juridical personality of the Imamat should not be confused.

The former is grounded in Ismaili doctrine.
The latter is a matter of positive law.

Portugal recognised the legal personality of the Ismaili Imamat in the 2009 Agreement. Article 1 describes the Imamat as the institution or office of the Imam. (Diário da República)

The 2015 Agreement then expressly recognised the Imamat’s:
“legal personality and capacity … to act in international relations.”

It also established the legal framework for the Seat in

Portugal and provided privileges, immunities and facilities in connection with official functions. (Diário da República)

Consequently, the legal personality of the Imamat should be understood as an external juridical recognition of the enduring institution or office of the Imamat.

It should not be interpreted as Portugal creating the Imam’s religious authority.

Nor should the Portuguese recognition be confused with the theological source of the Imamat.

⸻


7. The Diwan: Where It Fits
Article 4 of the 2025 Constitution fits naturally into this structure.

It does not state that the Diwan creates or constitutes the Imamat.

Rather, Article 4.1 provides that:
“In accordance with inherent Imamat authority”
the Imam may designate one or more Seats of the Ismaili Imamat.

That wording is significant.

The authority to designate the Seat comes from the authority of the Imamat.

The Diwan is therefore an institutional expression and Seat of the Imamat, not the source of the Imam’s authority.

This corresponds closely with the 2015 Portuguese Agreement, which defines the Seat as the global head office of the Imamat and states that its functions include facilitating the Imam’s spiritual and secular guidance to the Ismaili Community globally, promoting its quality of life and enhancing international relations and cooperation. (Diário da República)


⸻


8. A Simple Constitutional Map
The structure can therefore be represented as follows:

THE IMAMAT
The enduring office / institution
↓
THE IMAM
The hereditary Imam who embodies the Imamat at a given time
↓
IMAM’S INHERENT AUTHORITY
Religious and Jamati authority according to Ismaili doctrine
↓
THE CONSTITUTION
Ordained by the Imam for the worldwide Jamat
↓
JAMATI GOVERNANCE
Councils, institutions, offices, Boards and other constitutional bodies
↓
THE DIWAN
The designated Seat / global headquarters of the Imamat
↓
NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS
The Constitution operates worldwide subject to applicable law of the land
This is a clearer way of understanding the architecture than treating the Imam, Imamat, Constitution and Diwan as interchangeable terms.


⸻


PART II — “FUNCTIONAL SOVEREIGNTY”
9. What Does “Functional Sovereignty” Mean?

Mahmood H. Ahmed describes the Diwan as providing:
“functional sovereignty rooted in the guiding authority of the Imamat, not in territory.”

The underlying institutional idea is understandable.

The Imamat has recognised international juridical personality and capacity to engage in international relations. The Seat has international functions and treaty-based privileges and immunities. (Diário da República)

However, “functional sovereignty” should be treated as a conceptual description rather than as the terminology of the Portuguese treaty itself.
The treaty speaks in terms of:
* legal personality;
* capacity to act in international relations;
* a global Seat;
* official functions;
* privileges and immunities; and
* international cooperation.
It does not simply state that Portugal has recognised the Imamat as a sovereign state.
Indeed, Article 20 of the 2015 Agreement expressly provides for cooperation with Portuguese authorities in complying with Portuguese legislation. (Diário da República)

Accordingly, the expression “functional sovereignty” should not obscure the distinction between an internationally recognised juridical institution and a territorial sovereign state.

A legally safer formulation is:
The Imamat possesses an internationally recognised juridical personality and institutional capacity that is not dependent upon territorial sovereignty.


⸻


PART III — CORRECTING THE CHRONOLOGY
10. A Factual Correction to the Presentation
The slide refers to Portugal’s recognition of the Imamat’s juridical personality in June 2016.

The primary Portuguese legal record indicates an earlier chronology.

8 May 2009
The Agreement between Portugal and the Ismaili Imamat was signed.
It recognised the legal personality of the Ismaili Imamat. (Diário da República)

24 September 2010
The Portuguese Parliament approved the 2009 Agreement through Resolution 109/2010. (Diário da República)

3 June 2015
Portugal and the Imamat signed the Agreement concerning the establishment of the Seat in Portugal. (Diário da República)

27 November 2015
The Portuguese legal record subsequently confirmed completion of the procedures necessary for entry into force of the Seat Agreement. (Diário da República)

11 July 2018
Mawlana Hazar Imam designated the Henrique de Mendonça Palace in Lisbon as the Seat of the Ismaili Imamat and declared that it be known as the Diwan of the Ismaili Imamat. (The Ismaili Imamat)
Accordingly, June 2016 should not be presented as the date on which Portugal first recognised the juridical personality of the Imamat.


⸻


PART IV — WORLDWIDE APPLICATION AND THE LAW OF THE LAND

11. Article 3: Worldwide Constitutional Application Does Not Mean Territorial Sovereignty

Article 3 of the 2025 Constitution should be considered on its own wording.

The provision establishes worldwide application while recognising the overriding effect of applicable law of the land to the extent of inconsistency.
The principle is therefore:
Worldwide Jamati constitutional application ≠ territorial state sovereignty.
The Portuguese arrangements reflect the same distinction. Portugal recognised the internal organisation of the Ismaili community while expressly preserving the authority of Portuguese law. (Diário da República)

The 2015 Seat Agreement likewise requires cooperation with Portuguese authorities and compliance with Portuguese legislation. (Diário da República)
Thus, the worldwide character of the Constitution should be understood as a worldwide Jamati constitutional framework, not as a claim to territorial sovereignty.


⸻


PART V — THE NECESSARY SEPARATION: HISTORICAL CONSTITUTION AND 2025 CONSTITUTION

12. Methodological Principle
This is a critical point for the remainder of the study.
The historical constitutional framework and the 11 February 2025 Constitution must be analysed separately.
The publicly available historical text reflects the earlier constitutional framework, including the 1986 Constitution as amended in 1998. (Ismaili.net)

The 11 February 2025 Constitution is a new constitutional instrument.
Where a provision resembles an earlier provision, the relationship should therefore be described as:
* continuity;
* modification;
* consolidation;
* expansion;
* centralisation;
* replacement; or
* change.

The historical provision must never simply be carried forward into the 2025 Constitution by assumption.

This is particularly important concerning discipline and Personal Law, because the numbering changed.


⸻


PART VI — THE HISTORICAL CONSTITUTION: 1986/1998 FRAMEWORK
13. Historical Article 1 — Source of Authority

The historical Constitution expressly vested authority over religious and Jamati matters in Mawlana Hazar Imam and recognised his authority to establish, amend and interpret the constitutional framework and constitute institutions and offices. (Ismaili.net)
This establishes the historical constitutional principle that the institutional framework derives from the authority of the Imam.
It should, however, be cited as historical constitutional evidence, not automatically as the wording of the 2025 Constitution.


⸻


14. Historical Article 3 — Worldwide Application and Law of the Land
The historical Constitution provided for worldwide application while recognising the overriding effect of the law of the territory in which an Ismaili resides where inconsistency arises. (Ismaili.net)

The historical principle can therefore be expressed as:
Worldwide Jamati constitutional application + applicable national law.
This provides useful background when examining the corresponding provision of the 2025 Constitution.


⸻


15. Historical Article 5 — Councils
Historical Article 5 established National, Regional and Local Councils and described their role in the social governance, administration, guidance, supervision and coordination of the activities of the Jamat. (Ismaili.net)

Their objectives included matters such as:
* improving the quality of life of the Jamat;
* serving the needs of the Jamat;
* protecting interests;
* strengthening the Jamat;
* education;
* health;
* social welfare;
* housing;
* economic welfare;
* culture;
* women’s activities; and
* youth and sports.
This is significant historical evidence of an institutional conception in which Jamati governance included a substantial service function.


⸻


16. Historical Articles 6–8 — Institutional Service
The historical framework distinguished between:
* Apex Institutions;
* Central Institutions; and
* Tariqah and Religious Education Boards.

Historical provisions described Central Institutions as being constituted for the provision of services to the Jamat in areas including education, health, social welfare, housing, economic welfare, cultural activities, women’s activities and youth and sports development. (Ismaili.net)

This provides historical evidence for a constitutional conception of purpose-bound institutional authority.


⸻


17. Historical Article 9 — Grants and Review Boards
The historical Grants and Review Board framework established mechanisms relating to:
* financial discipline;
* accountability;
* cost and management effectiveness;
* proper application of resources;
* financial audits;
* management audits; and
* social audits.
The review framework extended to Councils, Central Institutions, Tariqah and Religious Education Boards and other bodies receiving grants or raising funds from the Jamat. (Ismaili.net)
The historical framework therefore expressly connected institutional authority with financial and managerial accountability.


⸻


18. Historical Articles 12–13 — Conciliation and Arbitration

The historical Constitution established International and National Conciliation and Arbitration Boards.
Their functions included conciliation and adjudication of specified disputes involving members of the Jamat, including commercial, civil, family, succession and related matters. (Ismaili.net)
The historical framework therefore created internal dispute-resolution mechanisms through which members could seek assistance rather than leaving every dispute solely to ordinary institutional administration.


⸻


19. Historical Article 14 — Disciplinary Action
Historical Article 14 dealt with disciplinary action.
Importantly, the historical provision allowed disciplinary proceedings to be commenced following a complaint by an authorised Council member or any Ismaili. (Ismaili.net)
That is important historical evidence of member participation in the constitutional disciplinary process.
However:
This is Historical Article 14. It must not be described as Article 17 of the 2025 Constitution.


⸻


20. Historical Article 15 — Personal Law
Historical Article 15 dealt with Personal Law, including matters such as:
* marriage;
* prohibited degrees;
* mehr;
* divorce;
* iddat;
* maintenance;
* care and guardianship;
* legitimacy;
* succession; and
* apostasy.
It also recognised the role of Ismaili Personal Law within the Shia Imami Ismaili School of Thought and the overriding relevance of territorial law where Ismaili Personal Law was not recognised or permitted. (Ismaili.net)
Again:
This is Historical Article 15. It must not be treated as the numbering of the 2025 Constitution.


⸻


21. Historical Article 17 — Titles of Honour
Historical Article 17 concerned Titles of Honour and Dignities.
This is particularly important because it demonstrates that the numbering of the 2025 Constitution cannot simply be mapped onto the earlier Constitution.


⸻


22. Historical Article 18 — Repeal
Historical Article 18 concerned the repeal of existing constitutions, subject to transitional provisions.
It did not concern Personal Law.
Accordingly, any analysis of Personal Law under the 2025 Constitution must be based on the actual 2025 provision rather than historical Article 15.


⸻


PART VII — THE 11 FEBRUARY 2025 CONSTITUTION
23. The 2025 Constitution Must Be Analysed on Its Own Terms
The 11 February 2025 Constitution should now be treated as a distinct constitutional instrument.
The publicly reproduced opening of the instrument identifies it as having been ordained by Mawlana Hazar Imam and states that Shia Imami Ismaili Muslims, wherever they may be, are governed by the Constitution. (Ismaili Forum)
The proper methodology is therefore:
First identify what the 2025 Constitution actually says. Then compare it with the historical Constitution.

Where there is continuity, identify it.

Where there is modification, identify it.

Where there is a new provision, identify it.

Where an historical provision has disappeared or been replaced, identify that too.

This distinction is essential for a legally credible study.


⸻


24. 2025 Article 1 — Source of Constitutional Authority
Article 1 of the 2025 Constitution should be analysed according to its own wording.

The central question remains:
From where does constitutional authority arise?

The answer is found in the Imam’s inherent authority and in the authority exercised by him in ordaining the constitutional instrument.

This provides the starting point for examining all subsequent institutional powers.

⸻

25. 2025 Article 2 — Definitions and Constitutional Interpretation
Article 2 should likewise be examined independently.
Particular attention should be given to:
* the definition of the Constitution;
* the definition and status of Farmans;
* the relationship between the Constitution and subsequent Farmans;
* institutional definitions;
* the distinction between the Imamat, the Imam and the Seat;
* Rules and Regulations; and
* any other subsidiary instruments recognised by the Constitution.

The methodological principle is:

The 2025 Constitution must be read according to its own text and supplemented by Farmans or subsidiary instruments where the Constitution itself provides for that relationship.


⸻


26. 2025 Article 3 — Worldwide Application and Law of the Land
Article 3 should be analysed directly from the 2025 text.

The key relationship is between:
worldwide application of the Constitution
and
the overriding effect of applicable law of the land to the extent of inconsistency.

This provision is particularly important when considering:
* Personal Law;
* disciplinary mechanisms;
* institutional activities;
* member access; and
* constitutional remedies.
It also reinforces the distinction between worldwide Jamati governance and territorial state sovereignty.


⸻


27. 2025 Article 4 — The Seat of the Ismaili Imamat
Article 4 is a distinct and important 2025 provision.
It recognises the Imam’s authority to designate one or more Seats of the Ismaili Imamat and identifies the existing Seat as the Diwan of the Ismaili Imamat.
Its stated functions include:
* engagement with the Jamat;
* wider institutional interactions;
* diplomatic relations and discourse;
* endeavours to foster human flourishing; and
* such other purposes as Mawlana Hazar Imam may determine.

The provision therefore connects the constitutional framework directly with the institutional role of the Diwan.

It does not, however, make the Diwan synonymous with the Imamat.

The distinction remains:
Imamat = enduring institution / office
Imam = person embodying the Imamat
Diwan = designated Seat of the Imamat


⸻


PART VIII — 2025 INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: THE NEXT STAGE OF ANALYSIS
28. Article-by-Article Mapping of the 2025 Framework
The remaining 2025 provisions should be mapped from the authoritative text rather than reconstructed from the historical Constitution.

The analysis should cover, where applicable:
* Councils;
* Central Institutions;
* Apex Institutions;
* Tariqah and Religious Education structures;
* Grants and Review mechanisms;
* Conciliation and Arbitration;
* disciplinary mechanisms;
* Personal Law;
* appointments;
* terms of office;
* institutional powers;
* reporting and accountability; and
* member access.
For each provision, the same questions should be applied:
1. Authority
Who constitutes or authorises the institution?
2. Mandate
What does the provision actually require the institution to do?
3. Jamat
Does the provision expressly identify the Jamat, members, their welfare, interests or services?
4. Procedure
Does the provision create a procedure or entitlement that a member can invoke?
5. Accountability
Does the provision create review, complaint, appeal, reporting or another accountability mechanism?
This methodology prevents historical provisions from being silently carried forward into the 2025 framework.


⸻


PART IX — 2025 ARTICLE 17: DISCIPLINARY ACTION
29. 2025 Article 17 Must Be Analysed Separately
Under the numbering of the 2025 Constitution presently under examination, Article 17 is the disciplinary provision.
It should be analysed according to its 2025 wording.
Historical Article 14 should be used only as a comparator.
The comparison should ask:
Question Historical Constitution 2025 Constitution
Where is discipline located? Article 14 Article 17
Who may initiate proceedings? Historical Article 14 expressly included any Ismaili Verify from 2025 text
What conduct is covered? Historical Article 14 Verify from 2025 text
Who adjudicates? Historical CAB structure Verify 2025 structure
What procedural safeguards exist? Historical Constitution / Rules Verify 2025 Rules
What appeal or review exists? Historical provisions Verify 2025 provisions
Does the system apply to institutional officeholders? Requires textual analysis Verify 2025 text
The important principle is methodological:

Historical continuity may be evidence of institutional evolution, but it cannot substitute for the 2025 text.


⸻


PART X — 2025 ARTICLE 18: PERSONAL LAW
30. 2025 Article 18 Must Also Be Analysed Separately
Under the numbering presently being examined, Article 18 concerns Personal Law.
It should be treated entirely as a 2025 provision.
Historical Article 15 may be used to identify continuity or change, but it must not be used to fill gaps in Article 18.
The comparison should examine:
Issue Historical Article 15 2025 Article 18
Definition of Personal Law Historical wording Verify 2025 wording
Marriage Expressly included Verify
Divorce / iddat Expressly included Verify
Maintenance Expressly included Verify
Guardianship Expressly included Verify
Succession Expressly included Verify
Imam’s interpretive authority Expressly stated Verify
Ethical principles Not to be assumed from historical text Analyse 2025 wording
Law of the land Expressly recognised historically Verify 2025 wording
This distinction is particularly important because the 2025 formulation may reflect developments that were not present in the historical provision.


⸻


PART XI — THE JAMAT: CONSTITUTIONAL BENEFICIARY, PARTICIPANT AND RIGHTS-HOLDER
31. From the Source of Authority to the Purpose of Authority

Having established the relationship between the Imam, the Imamat, the Constitution and the Diwan, the next constitutional question is fundamental:

For whom does this constitutional system exist?

The answer cannot be derived merely from the titles or powers of institutional officeholders.
It must be examined from the constitutional framework itself.

The 2009 Portugal Agreement provides important external evidence. It records that the Imam had ordained the Ismaili Constitution for Shia Imami Ismaili Muslims worldwide and identifies purposes including the fostering of relationships among peoples, optimisation of resources and enabling meaningful contribution to the societies in which Ismaili Muslims live. The Agreement also records activity of the Imamat and the Ismaili Community “for the benefit of its members” and the wider Portuguese community. (Diário da República)

The 2015 Seat Agreement similarly identifies promotion of the quality of life of the global Shia Imami Ismaili Muslim Community as one of its purposes and states that the Seat is intended to facilitate the Imam’s spiritual and secular guidance to the Ismaili Community globally. (Diário da República)

The constitutional question therefore moves from:
Who possesses authority?
to:
How is that authority organised and exercised for the Jamat?


⸻


PART XII — THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE OF JAMATI SERVICE
32. The Historical Constitution Shows a Service-Oriented Institutional Framework

The historical Constitution provides substantial evidence of a constitutional conception in which institutions were established for defined Jamati purposes.

Historical Council provisions referred to:
* social governance;
* administration;
* guidance;
* supervision;
* coordination;
* protecting interests;
* maintaining unity;
* improving quality of life;
* education;
* health;
* social welfare;
* housing;
* economic welfare;
* culture;
* women’s activities;
* youth and sports;
* identifying problems confronting the Jamat;
* leadership development;
* serving the needs of the Jamat; and
* strengthening the Jamat and its institutions. (Ismaili.net)

Historical Central Institutions were similarly described as providing services to the Jamat. (Ismaili.net)

These are important historical foundations for examining the proposition that Jamati institutions have a service function.

But they remain historical evidence.

The next question is what the 2025 Constitution retained, modified, expanded or replaced.


⸻


PART XIII — “JAMAT FIRST” AS A TESTABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSITION
33. “Serve the Jamat” and the Meaning of “Jamat First”

The language of service in the historical framework is not incidental.

The institutional structure repeatedly refers to:
* service;
* needs;
* quality of life;
* development;
* guidance;
* coordination;
* protection of interests; and
* strengthening the Jamat.

That provides a substantive historical basis for examining the proposition that Jamati institutions have a service function.

But the legally disciplined formulation is not:
“Every member has an unrestricted right to obtain whatever outcome he or she wants.”

Nor is it:

“Institutions have no independent functions or responsibilities.”

Rather:

Constitutional institutions derive their authority from the Imam and are constituted under the constitutional framework to perform defined functions. Where those functions expressly concern the governance, service, welfare, development or protection of the Jamat, institutional authority should be examined in light of those constitutional purposes.

That is the legally disciplined meaning that can be given to the expression “Jamat First.”


⸻


PART XIV — ACCESS TO THE IMAM
34. Historical and 2025 Evidence Must Be Kept Separate
The question of access to the Imam requires the same methodological discipline.
Historical constitutional mechanism

Where the historical Constitution provided a petition mechanism through which a member’s petition could be transmitted to the Imam, that should be identified as historical constitutional evidence. (Ismaili.net)

2025 constitutional mechanism
The 2025 Constitution should then be examined independently to determine:
* whether the petition mechanism remains;
* whether its procedure has changed;
* whether Councils retain a transmission role;
* whether new mechanisms exist;
* whether any provision expressly protects direct communication; and
* whether subsequent Farmans supplement or modify the constitutional mechanism.

Portuguese treaty evidence
Separately, the 2009 Portugal Agreement provides external treaty evidence concerning communication between the Imam and believers. Article 4(4) provides for communication between the Imam and believers. (Diário da República)

These are three distinct categories of evidence:
Historical Constitution ≠ 2025 Constitution ≠ Portuguese treaty.
They should not be merged.


⸻


PART XV — ACCESS TO INFORMATION
35. Constitutional Access Is Not the Same as an Unlimited Right to Documents

This distinction strengthens the legal analysis.

It would be too broad to state:

Every member has an unrestricted legal right to every document held by every institution.
That conclusion would require specific authority.
Instead, the analysis should distinguish:

Constitutional access

Where the Constitution expressly provides a right, procedure or avenue of communication.

Farman-based access

Where the Imam expressly directs that information or guidance be made available.

Institutional transparency

Where disclosure is necessary to fulfil a constitutional duty or institutional mandate.

General information requests

Where no specific constitutional or Farman-based right has been identified.

This avoids overstating Jamati rights while preserving genuine rights and mechanisms where the text supports them.


⸻


PART XVI — THE JAMAT AS BENEFICIARY, PARTICIPANT AND RIGHTS-HOLDER

36. The Jamat Is Not Merely the Object of Governance
The constitutional relationship should therefore not be reduced to:
Imam → institutions → Jamat
with the Jamat merely receiving decisions made elsewhere.

A fuller constitutional description is:
Imam → Constitution → institutions → governance, service and benefit of the Jamat

The Jamat is therefore central to the purposes for which many constitutional institutions exist.

⸻

37. The Jamat as Participant
The constitutional framework, particularly when historical provisions are considered, provides mechanisms through which individual members can participate.

Depending on the provision, these may include:
* petitions;
* applications to Conciliation and Arbitration Boards;
* complaints;
* disciplinary proceedings;
* access to Jamati services;
* religious education;
* personal-law mechanisms;
* communication with the Imam; and
* participation through local and national Jamati structures.

The historical disciplinary provisions are particularly significant because they permitted any Ismaili to initiate disciplinary proceedings through the prescribed mechanism. (Ismaili.net)

Whether equivalent mechanisms exist under the 2025 Constitution must, however, be determined from the 2025 text.

⸻


38. The Jamat as Rights-Holder

It is therefore possible to distinguish three categories of constitutional position.
Individual rights and mechanisms
Rights and procedures belonging to an individual member where expressly established by the Constitution, Farman or applicable Rules.

Collective Jamati interests
Interests relating to:
* unity;
* quality of life;
* education;
* health;
* social welfare;
* economic welfare;
* cultural life;
* youth;
* women’s activities;
* development; and
* community institutions.

Institutional powers

Powers held by Councils, Boards and other institutions to perform their constitutional functions.

The third category should not automatically be treated as overriding the first two.
Institutional powers remain subject to the constitutional framework that creates and defines them.


⸻


PART XVII — ACCOUNTABILITY
39. Accountability Runs in More Than One Direction
The constitutional system contains a vertical relationship:
Imam → institutions
The Imam constitutes institutions and determines their authority.

There is also an institutional relationship:
Institutions → Jamat
Institutions perform defined functions for the Jamat where their mandates so provide.

And there may be a participatory relationship:
Jamat → institutions
Members use constitutional mechanisms to seek services, raise disputes, submit petitions and initiate specified proceedings where the relevant provisions permit.

The system should therefore not be understood solely as a one-way hierarchy.
It is better analysed as a system of:
authority + mandate + service + participation + accountability.


⸻


PART XVIII — LEADERSHIP AS CONSTITUTIONAL OFFICE

40. Institutional Office Is Not the Source of Unlimited Authority

The constitutional framework also affects how leadership should be understood.

An officeholder possesses authority because the Imam has constituted or appointed the office and because the Constitution, relevant instrument, Rules, Regulations and applicable mandate define its functions.

The officeholder’s authority therefore has to be examined against:
* the Constitution;
* Rules and Regulations;
* the instrument of appointment;
* applicable Farmans;
* the mandate of the institution; and
* applicable law of the land.
The title itself is not the source of unlimited authority.

Likewise, length of service does not itself establish additional constitutional authority.

Nor does institutional seniority necessarily remove an officeholder from whatever accountability mechanisms the Constitution, Farmans or Rules establish.


⸻


PART XIX — THE FOUR-PART CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP

41. Authority, Instrument, Institutions and Beneficiary

The emerging structure can therefore be expressed through four interconnected principles.

1. Authority
The Imam
The source of constitutional authority.

2. Instrument
The Constitution
The framework ordained by the Imam.

3. Institutions
Councils, Boards and other bodies
The mechanisms through which constitutional functions are carried out.

4. Beneficiary and participant
The Jamat
The worldwide community whose governance, welfare, religious life and development are central to the purposes of the constitutional framework.

Thus:
Authority is vested in the Imam.
Governance is organised through the Constitution.
Institutions exercise constitutionally constituted functions.
The Jamat is governed, served and protected through that system, to the extent established by the relevant provisions.

This is more precise than saying either that the Jamat “owns” the institutions or that institutions are independent of the Jamat.


⸻


PART XX — THE “JAMAT FIRST” TEST

42. A Practical Constitutional Test

Once the historical and 2025 provisions have been properly separated, the “Jamat First” principle can be tested through a series of objective questions.

For any institutional decision or action, ask:

Authority
What constitutional, Farman or other lawful authority permits the action?

Mandate
What is the institution’s defined constitutional purpose?

Jamat
Does the action relate to the needs or interests the institution was established to serve?

Procedure
Was the prescribed constitutional procedure followed?

Equality
Was the member treated consistently with the Constitution and applicable Rules?

Access
Was the member given the constitutional avenue available to them?

Accountability
Is there a mechanism for review, complaint, appeal or petition?

Law of the land
Does applicable national law modify or override the constitutional provision?
This provides an objective framework for examining institutional conduct without assuming the answer in advance.


⸻


PART XXI — THE “JAMAT FIRST” THESIS AFTER SEPARATING THE TWO CONSTITUTIONAL PERIODS

43. Three Stages of Analysis

The thesis should proceed in three stages.

Stage 1 — Historical evidence
The earlier Constitution demonstrates a developed institutional framework in which Councils, Central Institutions, financial review mechanisms and dispute-resolution bodies were established for defined Jamati purposes. (Ismaili.net)

Stage 2 — The 2025 Constitution
The 2025 Constitution must then be examined independently to determine which principles have been:
* retained;
* modified;
* expanded;
* centralised;
* replaced; or
* removed.
Stage 3 — Constitutional principle
Only after that comparison should the paper determine whether the evidence supports continuity in the proposition that constitutional institutions exist substantially for the governance, service, welfare and development of the Jamat.

The proposition is therefore not assumed.

It is tested.


⸻


PART XXII — THE THREE-LAYER EVIDENCE STRUCTURE

44. Four Categories of Evidence

The remainder of the study should use the following categories consistently.

HISTORICAL CONSTITUTION
The 1986 Constitution, including amendments and the constitutional framework applicable before 11 February 2025.

2025 CONSTITUTION
The constitutional instrument ordained on 11 February 2025 and its provisions as amended or supplemented thereafter.

FARMANS
Directions, guidance, commands or other pronouncements of the Imam, analysed according to their own date and wording.

PORTUGUESE TREATIES
External legal instruments concerning the legal personality of the Ismaili Imamat and the establishment of its Seat in Portugal.

RULES AND REGULATIONS
Subsidiary institutional instruments whose authority and relationship to the Constitution must be established from the relevant constitutional provisions.

INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE
What Councils, Boards, Secretariats and other bodies actually do in practice.

This final category is particularly important.

Constitutional text tells us what the framework provides. Institutional practice tells us how that framework is being implemented. The two should never automatically be treated as identical.


⸻


PART XXIII — CORE CONSTITUTIONAL THESIS

45. From Authority to Accountability

The constitutional analysis can now proceed through a logical sequence:
The Imam
is the source of constitutional authority.
↓
The Imamat
is the enduring institution or office embodied by the Imam.
↓
The Constitution
is ordained by the Imam as the framework for the worldwide Jamat.
↓
The institutions
are constituted under that framework with defined functions and responsibilities.
↓
The Jamat
is the worldwide community whose governance, welfare, religious life and development are the purposes served by the constitutional system.
↓
Individual members
may possess defined avenues of participation, petition, dispute resolution, complaint and access where established by the Constitution, Farmans or Rules.
↓
Accountability
therefore becomes an important component of constitutional governance.
The central constitutional question is consequently no longer simply:

“Who has authority?”
The constitutional framework answers that question.

The deeper question is:
“How is authority to be exercised through the institutions established under the Constitution, for what purposes, and with what responsibilities toward the Jamat?”

That is where the Jamat First principle becomes a constitutional proposition capable of examination rather than merely a slogan.


⸻


PART XXIV — REVISED CORE THESIS FOR THE WIDER STUDY

46. Final Formulation

The historical constitutional framework provides important evidence of the development of Jamati governance, institutional service, financial accountability, dispute resolution and member participation.

The 11 February 2025 Constitution, however, must be analysed independently and according to its own text.

Where the 2025 Constitution retains, modifies or replaces earlier provisions, those changes must be identified rather than assumed away.

The “Jamat First” principle should consequently be tested by examining:

* the actual 2025 constitutional mandates of institutions;
* the mechanisms available to individual members;
* the relationship between institutional authority and Jamati service;
* accountability provisions;
* the relationship between the Constitution and Farmans;
* applicable Rules and Regulations;
* the relationship between the Imamat and its institutions; and
* the overriding effect of applicable law of the land.
This approach preserves both constitutional continuity and constitutional change.

It recognises the authority of the Imam while requiring precision about what the Constitution actually provides at each historical stage.

The resulting constitutional proposition may therefore be stated as follows:

The Ismaili constitutional framework establishes authority in the Imam, expresses that authority through an Imam-ordained Constitution, and organises governance through institutions whose powers and functions are defined by the constitutional framework and related instruments. The worldwide Jamat is not merely the population upon whom institutional authority is exercised. Where the constitutional text identifies Jamati governance, service, welfare, development, protection of interests or member participation as institutional purposes or mechanisms, those provisions form an essential part of understanding the constitutional relationship between institutions and the Jamat.

The historical Constitution provides evidence of how that relationship developed before 11 February 2025.

The 2025 Constitution must then be examined on its own terms to establish what has been retained, changed or newly established.

“Jamat First” should therefore not be understood as a competing source of authority to the Imam.

Rather, it is a proposition about the purpose and exercise of constitutional institutional authority: where institutions are constituted to govern, serve, protect, develop or otherwise act for the Jamat, their authority should be understood and exercised within the constitutional mandates for which they were established.

The proper constitutional analysis of any institutional action is therefore to identify its source of authority, its defined mandate, the applicable Constitution and Farmans, any relevant Rules and Regulations, the procedural requirements, the position of affected members, the available mechanisms of accountability, and the applicable law of the land.


⸻


PART XXV — CONCLUSION
The presentation by Vazir Mahmood H. Ahmed provides a useful starting point for examining the relationship between the Imamat, the Imam, the Diwan and the Constitution.

The primary legal instruments support several important distinctions.

The Imamat is the enduring institution or office of the Imam.

The Imam is the person who embodies that institution at a particular point in history.

The Diwan is the designated Seat and global headquarters of the Imamat.

The Constitution is the instrument ordained by the Imam for the benefit & governance of the worldwide Jamat.

Portugal’s recognition concerns the juridical personality and international institutional capacity of the Imamat. It does not create the religious authority of the Imam. The Portuguese treaty framework also distinguishes the Imamat from its Seat and expressly recognises the Seat as the global head office of the Imamat. (Diário da República)

The phrase “functional sovereignty” may be useful as a conceptual description of the Imamat’s supranational institutional character, but it should not be allowed to obscure the legal distinction between an internationally recognised juridical institution and a territorial sovereign state.

The same precision is required when considering the Jamat.

The historical Constitution provides substantial evidence of a developed system of Jamati governance, institutional service, financial review, dispute resolution and member participation. But those historical provisions must remain historical provisions.

The 11 February 2025 Constitution is a distinct constitutional instrument and must be analysed according to its own language and numbering.
In particular:

Historical Article 14 = Disciplinary Action
2025 Article 17 = Disciplinary Action, subject to analysis of the 2025 text
Historical Article 15 = Personal Law
2025 Article 18 = Personal Law, subject to analysis of the 2025 text
Historical Article 17 = Titles of Honour
Historical Article 18 = Repeal

This separation is not merely a matter of drafting style.

It is essential to the legal credibility of the study.

Only by separating the historical Constitution from the 2025 Constitution can the study properly identify continuity, change, consolidation, modification and new constitutional developments. The 2025 constitution supersedes earlier constitutions

The ultimate constitutional enquiry therefore becomes:

How has the Imam-ordained constitutional framework evolved, how are its institutions constituted and empowered, what purposes and responsibilities does the 2025 Constitution assign to them, and what mechanisms does it provide through which the worldwide Jamat and individual members may participate, obtain services, communicate, seek redress and hold the constitutional system accountable?

⸻


Final Conclusion — The Jamat First Proposition

Subject to any further Farmans, constitutional instruments, Rules, Regulations or other authoritative materials that may not yet be publicly available, and subject also to examination of the complete text of the 11 February 2025 Constitution and all of its schedules and subsidiary provisions, the analysis above leads to a clear constitutional conclusion.

The 11 February 2025 Constitution supersedes the earlier constitutional framework and must therefore be examined on its own terms, while historical provisions may be used only to provide context and continuity and must not be treated as provisions of the 2025 Constitution unless they have been expressly carried forward.

At the same time, the 2025 Constitution cannot properly be separated from its source of authority. It was ordained by Mawlana Hazar Imam in exercise of the authority of the Imam of the Time. The Constitution itself is therefore not merely an institutional document produced by an administrative body. It is an instrument ordained by the Imam and, as such, falls within the broader framework of the Farmans and the authority of the Imamat.

The definition of a Farman is itself relevant: a pronouncement, direction, order or ruling made or given by Mawlana Hazar Imam. Within the Ismaili understanding of allegiance to the Imam, such authority is not optional or merely advisory. The Constitution must therefore be understood as an instrument to which the Jamat is bound and which is to be observed within the framework of the Imam’s authority.

The constitutional consequence: the Jamat comes first

Against that background, the evidence examined in this paper supports an assertive but constitutionally grounded proposition: the Jamat comes first.

This does not mean that the Jamat is a source of authority superior to the Imam, nor does it create a competing sovereignty. The opposite is true.

The proposition is that because the Constitution derives its authority from the Imam, and because the Constitution is ordained for the governance and benefit of the Jamat, the institutions established under it exist to serve the Jamat and to advance its spiritual and material well-being.

The constitutional chain is therefore:

Imam → Constitution → Institutions → Service to the Jamat.

The Jamat is not an incidental recipient of institutional activity. It is the community for whose governance, welfare, participation and development the constitutional and institutional framework exists.

Where the Constitution expressly creates procedures, protections, participation mechanisms, access, representation or other entitlements, members of the Jamat should accordingly be understood as participants and rights-holders within those defined constitutional mechanisms.

Spiritual and material well-being are not separate constitutional purposes

This conclusion is also consistent with the wider conception of the Imamat.

The Imam’s inherited authority encompasses the interpretation and guidance of the faith, but the role of the Imamat has also consistently included the improvement of the quality of life and well-being of the Jamat.

The distinction between spiritual and material well-being should therefore not be used to reduce the constitutional obligations of institutions to purely religious matters.

The constitutional and institutional purpose is broader:

the spiritual, intellectual, ethical, social, cultural and material well-being of the Jamat are interconnected dimensions of the Imam’s service to the community.

The Imamat’s authority is inherited; its institutional service is therefore exercised for the benefit, continuity and advancement of the Jamat.

The Diwan, likewise, should be understood within that institutional architecture. It is the Seat of the Ismaili Imamat and the locus from which the Imamat engages with the Jamat and with the wider world. The designation of the Seat and its functions reinforce rather than displace the central relationship between the Imamat and the Jamat.

Participation, inclusion and pluralism reinforce the same conclusion

The same conclusion emerges from the emphasis placed on community participation, inclusion, pluralism and community-led development.

Pluralism, in the Ismaili context, is not simply an institutional slogan concerning diversity. It is connected to the ethical and religious framework of the community and to the ability of people to live together with dignity, mutual respect and constructive engagement.

Similarly, the language of community participation and community-led development points away from a model in which the Jamat is merely the passive recipient of decisions made by institutions.

It points toward a model in which the Jamat is:

* included;
* heard;
* engaged;
* enabled to participate;
* involved in its own development; and
* treated as the principal community whose well-being the institutions are established to advance.

This is particularly significant when considered alongside the constitutional framework for Personal Law and ethical principles, insofar as those provisions are understood as part of the wider ethical and religious framework governing the community.

“Jamat First” is therefore a constitutional proposition, not a slogan. Jamat first does not mean to exclude but to include the wider communities we live and work with

For these reasons, “Jamat First” should not be dismissed as a slogan or as an assertion of institutional criticism.

It is a proposition that can be tested against the Constitution itself.

The proper question for every institution, office-holder, Council, Board or other constitutional body is therefore:

Does the exercise of this institutional authority advance the purpose for which the Constitution was ordained — namely, the governance, welfare, participation and spiritual and material benefit of the Jamat — consistently with the authority of the Imam and the Constitution?

That is the appropriate constitutional test.

It does not diminish the authority of the Imam.

It gives effect to it.

The authority of the Imam is the source.
The Constitution is the instrument.
The institutions are the means.
The Jamat is the community to be served.

Accordingly, subject to any authoritative material not presently available for examination, the strongest conclusion supported by the evidence reviewed in this paper is that the 2025 constitutional framework is fundamentally Jamat-centred: the institutions exist to serve the Jamat, and the spiritual and material advancement of the Jamat is central to the purpose of the Imamat’s constitutional and institutional order.

An Invitation to Constructive Constitutional Engagement

This paper is therefore not intended as criticism of the Imam, the Imamat or the institutions.

It is an invitation to clarify, strengthen and deepen understanding of the constitutional framework.

I respectfully invite Vazir Mahmood H. Ahmed, the members of the Constitution Update Committee, the Institute of Ismaili Studies (IIS), the Tariqah and Religious Education Boards (ITREB), and qualified Ismaili scholars and constitutional/legal experts to engage constructively with the analysis presented here.

In particular, I would welcome clarification on:

1. The complete authoritative text of the 11 February 2025 Constitution, including all Schedules, Rules, Regulations and subsidiary provisions;
2. The relationship between the 2025 Constitution and the earlier 1986/1998 constitutional framework, including confirmation of which historical provisions, if any, were expressly carried forward;
3. The constitutional status of Farmans and their relationship to the Constitution;
4. The constitutional position of the Jamat as beneficiary, participant and rights-holder, where the Constitution expressly creates corresponding mechanisms or entitlements;
5. The constitutional responsibilities of institutions and office-holders toward the Jamat;
6. The practical meaning of community participation, inclusion, pluralism and community-led development within the constitutional framework; and
7. The proper mechanisms through which members of the Jamat may obtain clarification, raise concerns, participate in constitutional processes and seek access to the Imam where ordinary institutional channels do not adequately address a matter.

Constructive correction is welcome.

If any proposition in this paper is incorrect, incomplete or superseded by an authoritative provision of the 2025 Constitution, a Farman, Rule, Regulation or other constitutional instrument, I would welcome the relevant provision being identified shared and explained.

That would not weaken the constitutional discussion.

It would strengthen it.

The objective is therefore simple:

to understand the Constitution as it was ordained, to distinguish clearly between historical and current constitutional provisions, and to ensure that the constitutional framework is understood and applied in a manner consistent with the authority and Farmans of the Imam and the purpose for which it was ordained — the governance, benefit continuity, spiritual and material well-being, participation pluralism and advancement of the Jamat quality of life

In that sense, and subject to the authoritative materials still to be made available, the principle of Jamat First emerges not as a challenge to the Imamat, but as a consequence of understanding the constitutional instrument within the authority and purpose from which it derives.

Primary legal and institutional sources
* Portuguese Republic — 2009 Agreement with the Ismaili Imamat, approved by Resolution 109/2010. (Diário da República)
* Portuguese Republic — 2015 Agreement concerning the establishment of the Seat of the Ismaili Imamat in Portugal, signed 3 June 2015 and approved by Resolution 135/2015. (Diário da República)
* The Ismaili Imamat — institutional history of the Seat and designation of the Diwan in Lisbon, 11 July 2018. (The Ismaili Imamat)
* Historical constitutional text — 1986 Constitution as amended in 1998, used solely as historical evidence and not as a substitute for the 2025 Constitution. (Ismaili.net)
* 11 February 2025 constitutional instrument — publicly reproduced opening text, used here only for the propositions expressly identified above pending examination of the authoritative complete text. (Ismaili Forum)
* The presentation slides of M Ahmad https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YlBETv ... p=drivesdk
mahebubchatur
Posts: 1159
Joined: Mon Jan 13, 2014 7:01 pm

Re: Ismaili Constitution 2025 - First signed by Shah Rahim Aga Khan V

Post by mahebubchatur »

Ismaili Constitution - 2025

An Educational Briefing
Personal Law - Article 18 - which now includes Ethics & ethics of Pluralism

Introduction

In light of the recent presentation to the UK Jamat, on the Ismaili Constitution by M Ahmad Ismaili Constitution committee - IIS DJI & LIF)

Central Proposition

“This paper asserts and concludes that the Constitution should not be understood as placing the religious authority of HazarImam in opposition to the law of the land. Rather, it establishes a constitutional framework in which the authority of the Imam and the application of the law of the land operate within their respective spheres, with the Constitution itself expressly recognising the overriding effect of the laws of the land where applicable.”

Personal Law in the constitution is important because it concerns matters affecting an individual’s personal and family life.

It also illustrates an important feature of the Ismaili Constitution: the relationship between the Imam’s religious authority, the Ismaili interpretation of Personal Law, the ethical principles applicable within the Jamat, and the civil law applicable in the country in which an Ismaili is domiciled or resides.

Article 18.1 of the 2025 Constitution provides:

“In this Article the term ‘personal law’ shall mean the rules and ethical principles governing the personal relationship of an individual to others in the society in which the individual lives, and shall include, without limitation…”

The express inclusion of the words “ethical principles” is in the constitution therefore significant.

It indicates that Personal Law, within the constitutional framework, is not described merely as a collection of formal rules. It also encompasses principles concerning how individuals are expected to conduct themselves in relation to others.

This briefing is intended as educational material to help readers examine and understand that relationship directly from the constitutional framework.

⸻

1. What is Personal Law?

In the constitutional context, Personal Law concerns rules and ethical principles governing personal relationships and related matters.

Historically, the constitutional provisions have included matters such as:

* marriage, including prohibited degrees and marriage with non-Ismailis;
* mehr;
* nullity of marriage;
* restitution of conjugal rights;
* divorce;
* iddat and maintenance;
* care and guardianship;
* legitimacy;
* succession; and
* apostasy.

Earlier constitutional formulations expressly described Personal Law as the law that had evolved within the Shia Imami Ismaili School of Thought of Islam.

The 2025 wording should therefore be read in the context of both the Imam’s religious authority and the legal system of the country concerned.

What is iddat?

Iddat (ʿiddah) is a prescribed period following certain forms of dissolution of marriage, or following the death of a husband, during which particular Islamic personal-law rules apply before a woman may remarry.

Its duration and detailed requirements depend upon the circumstances and the applicable interpretation of Islamic personal law.

The continued inclusion of iddat in Article 18 demonstrates that the 2025 Constitution continues to recognise particular elements of the Ismaili personal-law tradition, while also expressly referring to maintenance.

⸻

2. Imam’s Authority Concerning Ismaili Personal Law

A fundamental principle in the constitutional framework has been that Mawlana Hazar Imam has authority to interpret Personal Law evolved within the Shia Imami Ismaili School of Thought.

Article 18.3 of the 2025 Constitution expressly provides:

“Mawlana Hazar Imam has the sole right to interpret and guide his murids in matters relating to the personal law evolved within the Shia Imami Ismaili School of Thought of Islam.”

This is important because Personal Law is not simply a matter of institutional administration. It concerns religious guidance applicable to important aspects of the personal and family life of the Jamat.

For practising Ismailis, this also needs to be understood in the context of Bay’ah and allegiance to the Imam, including the religious principle of seeking and following the Imam’s guidance in matters falling within his religious authority.

The constitutional provision therefore establishes a distinction between:

1. The Imam’s religious authority and guidance concerning Ismaili Personal Law; and

2. The civil law that a state applies within its territory.

These two dimensions should not be conflated.

Recognising the Imam’s religious authority does not mean that the Constitution creates a separate civil jurisdiction overriding the mandatory law of the country in which an Ismaili lives.

⸻

3. Article 18 and Article 3.2 — The Law of the Land

Article 18 should be read together with the wider constitutional framework, particularly Article 3.2.

Article 3.2 provides:

“This Constitution shall apply to Ismailis worldwide subject only to the overriding effect of any applicable laws of the land of abode of any Ismaili to the extent of any inconsistency.”

This wording is important.

It does not merely state that the Constitution “respects” the law of the land. It expressly recognises the overriding effect of applicable laws of the land to the extent that an inconsistency exists.

Article 18.4 applies this principle specifically to Personal Law.

It provides that:

“To the extent that the territory of domicile or residence of Ismailis does not recognise and apply or allow the application of the personal law of Ismailis, they shall be governed in that territory by such personal law as is applicable to them under the law of that territory.”

The provisions should therefore be read together.

The constitutional structure is:

Article 18.1
Personal Law consists of rules and ethical principles.

↓

Article 18.2
The Personal Law applicable to Ismailis is that evolved within the Shia Imami Ismaili School of Thought, subject to Article 18.4.

↓

Article 18.3
Mawlana Hazar Imam has the sole right to interpret and guide murids concerning that Personal Law.

↓

Article 18.4
Where the territory does not recognise, apply or permit the application of Ismaili Personal Law, the applicable personal law under the law of that territory governs.

↓

Article 3.2
More generally, applicable laws of the land have overriding effect to the extent of inconsistency.

This is an important constitutional distinction.

⸻

4. Personal Law, Ethical Principles and Religious Practice

The inclusion of “ethical principles” is significant because personal relationships are not merely technical legal matters.

They involve questions of:

* responsibility;
* dignity;
* justice;
* good faith;
* mutual respect;
* family relationships;
* responsibility towards others;
* peaceful coexistence; and
* conduct within society.

The addition of “ethical principles” therefore provides a broader framework within which Personal Law is to be understood.

For members of the Jamat who practise the faith and follow the Imam’s guidance, those ethical principles may have genuine religious significance even where the corresponding principle does not itself constitute enforceable civil law.

This distinction is important.

An ethical or religious obligation may govern an individual’s conduct within the religious framework of the Jamat, without becoming an independent source of civil law enforceable by a state court.

⸻

5. Pluralism as an Ethical Principle

The question of ethical principles also connects directly with the Constitution’s express recognition of pluralism and as Imam has said it is a part of our faith and a commitment.

The 2025 Constitution identifies the following as a Partnership Institution:

“GLOBAL CENTRE FOR PLURALISM — CENTRE MONDIAL DU PLURALISME, founded by the Ismaili Imamat in partnership with Canada, is a not-for-profit organisation established to advance positive responses to the challenge of living peacefully and productively together in diverse societies through research, education and knowledge exchange.”

This is important constitutional context.

Pluralism is therefore not merely an external development concept or an institutional programme unrelated to the constitutional framework. The Constitution itself identifies the Global Centre for Pluralism as a Partnership Institution founded by the Ismaili Imamat in partnership with Canada.

The Global Centre for Pluralism describes pluralism as an “ethic of respect for diversity” and explains its work in terms of enabling people to live peacefully and productively together in diverse societies.

This provides a relevant context when considering what may be encompassed by the new constitutional reference to “ethical principles.”

Pluralism can be understood as part of the wider ethical framework through which Ismailis are encouraged to engage with people of different faiths, cultures, identities and backgrounds.

It does not, however, mean that pluralism becomes a separate body of civil law.

The distinction remains:

Ethical principle → religious and moral framework

Civil law → legally enforceable law of the jurisdiction

⸻

6. Personal Law Is Therefore Not Simply “Civil Law”

It is useful to distinguish three related but different concepts.

First — Religious authority

The Imam has religious authority to provide interpretation and guidance concerning Ismaili Personal Law.

Second — Ismaili constitutional and institutional framework

The Constitution establishes the framework within which the Jamat understands and administers matters falling within the Imam’s guidance and the constitutional provisions governing the community.

Third — Civil law

The courts and public authorities of the country concerned determine the civil rights and legal obligations that are enforceable under that country’s law.

Recognising the third does not negate the first.

Conversely, recognising the Imam’s religious authority does not mean that the Constitution overrides the law of the country in which an Ismaili lives.

⸻

7. Domicile, Residence and the Law of the Country

The constitutional framework expressly recognises the importance of domicile and residence.

Where the country of an Ismaili’s domicile or residence does not recognise, apply or permit the application of Ismaili Personal Law, Article 18.4 provides that the individual is governed by the personal law applicable under the law of that territory.

This principle is particularly relevant to Ismailis living in jurisdictions such as England and Wales, Canada, the United States, Australia and elsewhere where personal and family matters are governed by applicable civil law.

For example, in England and Wales, matters such as marriage, divorce, financial remedies, child arrangements, inheritance and succession are governed by the applicable law of England and Wales.

Religious guidance may be of profound importance to an individual, but it does not by itself replace the jurisdiction of the civil courts.

The constitutional framework therefore recognises both:

the religious authority of the Imam over Ismaili Personal Law;

and

the authority of the state over matters governed by its own law.

⸻

8. Iddat and Maintenance — An Illustration

Iddat provides a useful illustration of this distinction.

Iddat is part of the Islamic personal-law tradition and is expressly included within Article 18.

An Ismaili may therefore have religious obligations and guidance concerning iddat and related matters.

At the same time, the legal rights and obligations recognised and enforceable by a civil court depend upon the law applicable in the relevant jurisdiction.

The same distinction applies to:

* maintenance;
* divorce;
* guardianship;
* succession;
* inheritance;
* marriage;
* nullity; and
* other matters falling within Personal Law.

The religious and ethical dimension and the civil legal dimension may therefore coexist without being identical.

⸻

9. The Principle of the Law of the Land

The constitutional framework does not establish a “jurisdiction within a jurisdiction.”

The existence of Ismaili Personal Law does not exempt members or community institutions from mandatory national law.

Where a particular internal rule, practice or act is inconsistent with a mandatory provision of applicable law, the law of the jurisdiction prevails to the extent of that inconsistency, as expressly recognised by Article 3.2 and, specifically in relation to Personal Law, Article 18.4.

This is not inconsistent with religious freedom.

Rather, it provides a framework in which:

religious guidance operates within its religious sphere;

ethical principles guide conduct within the community;

and

civil law determines the legal rights and obligations enforceable by the state.

⸻

10. Religious Doctrine and Institutional Governance Are Different Questions

This distinction becomes particularly important when considering constitutional governance.

A court may be asked to determine what a religious doctrine means or whether a particular religious teaching is spiritually authoritative.

That is fundamentally different from asking whether an institution has complied with an obligation contained in its own governing Constitution.

For example, the question:

“Is this religious teaching spiritually correct?”

is fundamentally different from:

“Has this institution complied with an objectively identifiable obligation contained in its own governing Constitution?”

The first concerns religious doctrine.

The second concerns institutional governance and compliance.

The distinction should be maintained carefully.

⸻

11. Access to the Constitution

The distinction is particularly relevant to access to the Constitution.

If the Constitution is the instrument establishing the governance framework of the community, and if the constitutional framework provides for the Constitution to be made available to members, the question whether members have actually been given access to that document can be considered as a question of governance and compliance.

It does not necessarily require a court to determine whether the religious principles underlying the Constitution are spiritually correct or whether the Imam’s religious authority is valid.

The question can instead be:

Has the institution complied with its own constitutional and governance obligations concerning access to its governing instrument?

That is an objectively different question from adjudicating theology.

⸻

12. The 18 March 2025 Direction Concerning Access

The direction of 18 March 2025 concerning making the updated Constitution available to the Jamat is relevant in this context.

For present purposes, its significance is not that a court should determine its theological meaning.

Rather, it is evidence of the community’s own constitutional and institutional position concerning the availability of its governing instrument.

A document may have a religious origin or contain material of religious significance while simultaneously performing a constitutional, administrative or governance function.

The fact that a document is connected with religion does not necessarily mean that every dispute concerning that document is a dispute about religious doctrine.

The nature of the particular issue must be examined.

⸻

13. Why Access to a Governing Constitution Matters

There is an important practical reason why access to a governing Constitution matters.

Constitutional rights and obligations cannot operate effectively if the people whom the Constitution governs cannot know what the Constitution provides.

A person cannot meaningfully understand, exercise or comply with constitutional rights and responsibilities if the governing instrument is unavailable to that person.

Transparency and accessibility are therefore closely connected with meaningful constitutional governance.

This is particularly significant where the Constitution contains provisions concerning:

* Personal Law;
* ethical principles;
* institutional responsibilities;
* members’ rights and responsibilities;
* governance structures; and
* the relationship between members and community institutions.

Access allows members to distinguish between:

what the Constitution actually provides

and

what may merely be asserted or understood informally by others.

Most important Imam has directed in the constitution for it to be given to every Ismaili and to be read with Farmans

⸻

14. Constitutional Obligation and Legal Remedy Are Separate Questions

The argument should nevertheless remain within appropriate legal limits.

The fact that a Constitution requires or directs something does not, by itself, establish the precise legal remedy available to a member in every jurisdiction.

Whether a court can order production or disclosure, and under what legal mechanism, depends upon matters including:

* the jurisdiction;
* the legal status of the relevant institution;
* the wording of the Constitution;
* the legal relationship between the institution and its members;
* applicable legislation; and
* the relevant principles of contract, association, charity, trust or corporate law.

The constitutional argument and the general-law argument should therefore be treated as related but distinct.

The questions are:

First: What does the community’s own Constitution require?

Second: Does that requirement create, or is it supported by, a legally enforceable obligation under the law of the jurisdiction?

Third: What remedy, if any, does the applicable law provide where that obligation has not been fulfilled?

That approach keeps the analysis factual and legally grounded.

⸻

15. Religious Freedom and Legal Accountability

The same approach helps avoid an unnecessary confrontation between religious freedom and legal accountability.

Seeking legal clarification does not necessarily mean subjecting religious doctrine to judicial review.

It may instead mean ensuring that the ordinary legal consequences of operating an institution are respected while leaving theological questions to the appropriate religious authority.

Religious character does not, by itself, place an institution beyond the ordinary operation of the law.

Equally, the application of ordinary law to questions of institutional governance does not require a court to determine matters of religious doctrine.

The proper approach is to identify the nature of the question being asked and determine whether it concerns:

theology;

or

an objectively ascertainable legal, constitutional or governance obligation.

⸻

16. What Appears to Have Changed — and What Should Be Examined Further

The 2025 Constitution has updated the constitutional treatment of Personal Law and expressly places it within a framework of rules and ethical principles.

The addition of “ethical principles” is therefore a textual change that merits examination.

At the same time, Articles 3.2 and 18.4 retain the constitutional recognition of the overriding effect of applicable territorial law.

Accordingly, the key question is not whether the addition of “ethical principles” creates a competing civil legal system.

The constitutional text does not appear to say that.

Rather, the important questions are:

* What precisely is encompassed by “ethical principles”?
* How are those principles interpreted and communicated?
* How do they relate to the Imam’s religious guidance?
* How does pluralism fit within that ethical framework?
* How does Article 18 operate alongside Article 3.2?
* How does Article 18.4 operate in jurisdictions that do not recognise Ismaili Personal Law?
* What changes, if any, were made to the earlier Personal Law provisions?

These are legitimate questions of constitutional interpretation and education.

They do not require an argument that the Constitution should be read independently of the Imam’s guidance or independently of the law of the land.

⸻

17. Information Required for a Complete Understanding

It is therefore directed by Imam for the Jamat to have access to the full constitutional text together with relevant supporting material, including, where applicable:

* relevant Farmans;
* Rules;
* Regulations;
* policies;
* annotations;
* explanatory material; and
* other authoritative guidance concerning the implementation of Article 18.

This would enable members to understand the precise relationship between the new Article 18, earlier constitutional provisions and subsequent guidance.

It would also allow members to distinguish clearly between:

the constitutional text itself;

religious guidance;

ethical principles;

institutional practice;

and

the mandatory law of the jurisdiction.

⸻

18. The Broader Constitutional Principle

The resulting position can therefore be expressed relatively simply.

The community’s own constitutional framework provides a structure for religious, ethical and institutional governance.

Within that framework, the Imam has religious authority to interpret and guide murids concerning Ismaili Personal Law.

The 2025 Constitution expressly describes Personal Law as including both rules and ethical principles.

The Constitution also expressly recognises pluralism through its identification of the Global Centre for Pluralism as a Partnership Institution founded by the Ismaili Imamat in partnership with Canada.

At the same time, Article 3.2 expressly provides that applicable laws of the land have overriding effect to the extent of inconsistency, while Article 18.4 specifically provides for the applicable territorial personal law where Ismaili Personal Law is not recognised, applied or permitted.

The result is therefore not:

Personal Law versus national law.

Rather, it is:

religious authority + ethical principles + constitutional governance, operating within the legal order of the country in which the Jamat lives.

⸻

Conclusion

The Personal Law provisions of the 2025 Constitution are significant because they bring together three principal elements:

the Imam’s religious authority and guidance;

the Ismaili constitutional and ethical framework;

and

the civil law of the country in which an Ismaili lives.

For members of the Jamat, understanding this distinction is important.

Religious guidance concerning Personal Law can be followed as part of one’s faith and allegiance to the Imam, while civil rights and obligations remain governed by the applicable law of the jurisdiction.

The introduction of the words “ethical principles” broadens the constitutional description of Personal Law beyond formal rules alone. Those ethical principles may include matters such as responsibility, justice, respect for others, peaceful coexistence and pluralism. The Constitution’s express recognition of the Global Centre for Pluralism provides an important institutional context for understanding the place of pluralism within the wider ethical framework.

However, the inclusion of ethical principles does not, on the face of Articles 3.2 and 18.4, displace the law of the land.

Where there is an inconsistency with applicable civil law, the law of the land has overriding legal effect.

Similarly, the recognition of the Imam’s religious authority does not mean that the community’s institutions operate outside the ordinary legal framework of the jurisdictions in which they operate.

Conversely, applying ordinary law to objectively identifiable questions of institutional governance does not require a court to adjudicate upon the theological validity of the Imam’s guidance.

This distinction is particularly important in relation to access to the Constitution and compliance with constitutional governance obligations. A question concerning whether an institution has complied with its own governing constitutional requirements is not necessarily a question of religious doctrine. It may instead be a question of governance, transparency, constitutional compliance and applicable law.

The appropriate approach is therefore to read the 2025 Ismaili Constitution as a whole, together with relevant Farmans and guidance of Mawlana Hazar Imam, while giving due effect to the applicable law of the land.

This briefing is intended as an educational contribution to that understanding and to encourage informed reading of the 2025 Ismaili Constitution, particularly Article 18, and of the relationship between Personal Law, ethical principles, pluralism, constitutional governance and the law of the land.

Conclusion

This educational briefing paper concludes that there is no inherent conflict between the Personal Law and ethical principles contained in the 2025 Ismaili Constitution, the religious authority of Mawlana Hazar Imam, and the applicable law of the land. The Constitution is itself ordained by the Imam and must therefore be understood within the religious and constitutional authority from which it derives. At the same time, the Constitution expressly operates subject to the law of the land.

The Constitution and the Farmans of Mawlana Hazar Imam should therefore be read and understood together, rather than treated as separate or competing sources. The religious and theological dimensions of the Imamat are distinct from the governance and institutional framework established through the Constitution. Recognising this distinction does not diminish the Imam’s religious authority; rather, it gives effect to the constitutional framework that the Imam himself has ordained.

In particular, the inclusion of Personal Law and ethical principles within the 2025 Constitution should not be interpreted as creating a conflict between religious authority and secular law. The Constitution establishes the framework for the Jamat while expressly recognising the overriding application of the law of the land where applicable. Consequently, observance of the Constitution does not require the Jamat or its institutions to act contrary to the law of the jurisdiction in which they operate.

A further consequence follows from the Constitution’s Jamat-centred purpose. The Jamat is not merely the subject of institutional governance; it is the community for whose benefit the constitutional framework exists. Where the Constitution and Farmans are intended for the Jamat, access to those foundational documents is therefore a matter of constitutional significance. Members should not be required to rely solely upon summaries, interpretations or verbal assurances where the underlying constitutional or Farman text is capable of being provided.

Accordingly, access to the Constitution and applicable Farmans should be understood as part of the rights and responsibilities arising within the constitutional relationship between the Imam, the institutions and the Jamat. Where access is withheld, the question is not whether a member is challenging the authority of the Imam. On the contrary, seeking access to the governing documents can be understood as seeking to understand and give effect to the Imam’s own ordained constitutional framework.

Institutional office-bearers therefore cannot simply rely upon a general assertion that they are acting “on behalf of the Imam” as a substitute for the constitutional basis, authority or explanation for withholding material from members. Authority carries corresponding responsibility and accountability. Where the Constitution establishes duties, procedures, rights or responsibilities, those provisions provide the framework within which institutional decisions should be made and understood.

Finally, where an individual is unable to obtain access to the Constitution, applicable Farmans or the information necessary to understand the basis of an institutional decision through the normal constitutional and institutional channels, the existence of a legal right under the law of the relevant jurisdiction is not, in itself, contrary to the authority of the Imam. Rather, where the Constitution itself recognises the law of the land, lawful recourse to that legal framework may serve to clarify and enforce the constitutional relationship established by the Imam.

The central proposition of this briefing paper is therefore straightforward:

The Constitution should not be understood as placing the authority of the Imam and the law of the land in opposition. The 2025 Constitution is an instrument of the Imam’s authority that establishes a framework for the governance of the Jamat, while expressly operating within the applicable law of the land. Accountability, transparency and access to the constitutional and Farman framework are therefore not challenges to the Imamat. They are part of giving practical effect to the constitutional order ordained for the Jamat.


Sources
The Presentation slides The presentation slides by Vazir Mahmood H. Ahmed
Secretary to the Constitution Review Committee 1986
Convenor of the Constitution Update Committee 2025
Venue: London UK

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YlBETv ... p=drivesdk

The Ismaili Constitution of 11 February 2026
mahebubchatur
Posts: 1159
Joined: Mon Jan 13, 2014 7:01 pm

Ismaili Constitution 2025 - First signed by Shah Rahim Aga Khan V

Post by mahebubchatur »

FARMANS, COPYRIGHT & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

Ismaili Constitution 2025

Updated Educational Briefing

Following the presentation on the 2025 Constitution by Mahmood H. Ahmed, Convener of the 2025 Constitution Update Committee

Original study and submission: 13 June 2026
Updated: 26 September 2026

⸻

1. CENTRAL PROPOSITION

This briefing paper asserts that every member of the Jamat should have access to the Farmans of Mawlana Hazar Imam, including the Ismaili Constitution itself, because the Constitution is a Farman within the Constitution’s own definition of that term, and both are given for the guidance and benefit of the Jamat through the institutions established under the Constitution to serve the Jamat.

The Constitution defines a Farman as:

“Any pronouncement, direction, order or ruling made or given by Mawlana Hazar Imam.”

On that definition, this paper treats the Constitution itself as falling within the category of Farman, while also recognising the Constitution’s express provision that it is to be read together with Farmans, with a later Farman prevailing where applicable in the event of conflict.

The central proposition is therefore simple:

The Farmans of Mawlana Hazar Imam, including the Constitution itself, are for the Jamat; the institutions established under the Constitution exist to serve the Jamat; and the institutions therefore have a responsibility to facilitate the Jamat’s access to that guidance.

Any intellectual-property rights associated with a particular recording, publication, translation, compilation or other medium through which a Farman is communicated should be understood within that institutional purpose and should not, in themselves, be used to withhold the underlying Farman from the Jamat.

The Jamat and its institutions should not therefore be viewed as separate or competing interests, but as parts of one constitutional community, bound together by the Constitution and the authority of the Imam.

Where an institution records, publishes, translates, reproduces, preserves or otherwise disseminates a Farman or the Constitution, it does so within its institutional mandate to serve the Jamat.

Accordingly, the presumption advanced by this paper is that Farmans and the Constitution should be available to every member of the Jamat for whom they are intended and for whose benefit the institutions exist. Any exception should require an express and specific direction from Mawlana Hazar Imam restricting or withholding the particular material.

In simple terms: the institutions serve the Jamat; the Farmans and Constitution are given for the Jamat; and the means of communicating them should not become a means of withholding them from the Jamat.

This proposition is, of course, subject to the applicable law of the jurisdiction concerned.

⸻

2. PURPOSE OF THIS BRIEFING

This educational briefing examines the relationship between:

* Farmans of Mawlana Hazar Imam;
* the Ismaili Constitution ordained on 11 February 2025;
* the Jamat for whose benefit the Constitution operates;
* the institutions established under the constitutional framework;
* recordings, publications, translations and other forms of dissemination; and
* intellectual-property and copyright claims associated with those materials.

The purpose is educational and constitutional. It is not intended to challenge the legitimacy of intellectual-property protection in appropriate circumstances or the role of institutions in producing, authenticating and preserving authorised publications.

Rather, it examines a fundamental question:

Can intellectual-property rights in a recording, publication or other medium through which a Farman—including the Constitution itself—is communicated properly be used to prevent members of the Jamat from receiving, preserving, studying or sharing the underlying Farman?

The central proposition advanced in this paper is that such rights should not, by themselves, be used for that purpose, unless there is a clear and specific direction from Mawlana Hazar Imam establishing a restriction.

⸻

3. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFINITION OF A FARMAN

The 2025 Ismaili Constitution defines a Farman as:

“Any pronouncement, direction, order or ruling made or given by Mawlana Hazar Imam.”

This definition is fundamental.

A Farman is therefore not simply a literary work, recording, publication or ordinary communication. A recording or publication may be the medium through which a Farman reaches the Jamat, but the medium is not the Farman itself.

The distinction is fundamental:

The Farman is the pronouncement, direction, order or ruling of Mawlana Hazar Imam.

Its source and nature must also be understood within the religious authority of the Imam.

In the Farmans and guidance cited in this study, Mawlana Hazar Imam has described the Imam in terms including the inheritor of Prophetic authority, bearer of the Light of God and Mazhar of God, through whom guidance, blessings and intercession are conveyed to the Jamat.

These propositions should be understood from the relevant Farmans and authoritative statements cited in this study and are not theological characterisations created by this paper.

Accordingly, within the Ismaili understanding of the Imamat, a Farman is not merely an ordinary literary or informational communication. It is guidance conveyed by the Imam through the Institution of the Imamat in the exercise of his religious authority.

A recording, transcript, translation, publication, compilation or digital file is, by contrast, a medium through which that Farman may be communicated, preserved or reproduced.

The distinction between the Farman and the medium through which it is communicated is therefore fundamental.

⸻

4. THE FARMAN AND INTELLECTUAL CREATION

The question of copyright becomes more complex when a Farman is recorded, transcribed, translated, edited, compiled, designed or published.

There may be legitimate intellectual-property interests in:

* the recording itself;
* sound or video production;
* a particular transcription;
* a translation;
* editorial material;
* photographs;
* graphic design;
* typography and layout;
* a compilation or collection;
* an authorised publication; or
* a particular digital presentation.

Those rights should not automatically be confused with ownership of the underlying spiritual or constitutional guidance contained in the Farman.

The central issue is therefore not whether copyright can exist in a particular work associated with a Farman.

It is:

Whether copyright in that particular work can properly be used to prevent the Jamat from accessing the Farman itself.

⸻

5. THE ESSENTIAL DISTINCTION

For purposes of this briefing, the following distinction should be maintained throughout.

A. The Farman or Constitution itself

The substantive pronouncement, direction, order, ruling or constitutional instrument.

B. The medium through which it is communicated

This may include:

* a recording;
* transcript;
* translation;
* compilation;
* website;
* digital file;
* photograph;
* audio or video production;
* printed edition; or
* other form of presentation.

An institution may have legitimate rights concerning B.

That does not necessarily establish a proprietary right over A.

This distinction is particularly important where an institution exists to serve the Jamat and is communicating material intended for the Jamat.

⸻

6. THE JAMAT AS THE PRIMARY BENEFICIARY

The constitutional relationship should be considered from the purpose for which the institutions exist.

The Constitution establishes a framework of governance and service for the Jamat.

The institutions operate within that framework.

Their authority and functions therefore arise within a constitutional structure established for the benefit, guidance, welfare and development of the Jamat.

This gives rise to an important constitutional principle:

Where an institution is entrusted with communicating the guidance of Mawlana Hazar Imam to the Jamat, its role should be understood as one of service and stewardship, rather than as a basis for withholding that guidance from the community it exists to serve.

The expression “Jamat First” should be understood in this context: the Jamat is the primary beneficiary of the constitutional framework. It does not mean that the Jamat exists in opposition to other communities or interests.

⸻

7. THE INSTITUTIONS AND THE JAMAT

The relationship between the Jamat and the institutions should not be characterised as though there are two unrelated parties:

the Jamat on one side and the institutions on the other.

The institutions are part of the constitutional framework through which the Jamat is served.

The Jamat and its institutions are therefore connected parts of one constitutional community.

This has particular significance where an institution:

* receives a Farman;
* records it;
* publishes it;
* translates it;
* preserves it;
* distributes it; or
* otherwise makes it available.

The institution is performing an institutional function for the benefit of the Jamat.

It follows that the existence of institutional copyright or intellectual-property rights should not automatically be interpreted as giving the institution an independent right to determine that the Jamat cannot receive the underlying guidance.

⸻

8. THEOLOGICAL DIMENSION

For murids, the Farman has a significance extending beyond ordinary literary or informational material.

Within the Ismaili understanding of Bay‘ah and the Institution of the Imamat, Farmans are understood as guidance conveyed by the Imam to the Jamat.

The constitutional definition itself recognises the authority of a Farman as a pronouncement, direction, order or ruling of Mawlana Hazar Imam.

Reducing the question entirely to ordinary copyright terminology risks overlooking the constitutional and religious context in which the material exists.

The legal question may concern copyright.

The constitutional question is different:

For whom was the guidance given, and what is the institutional responsibility toward the people for whom it was given?

This briefing proceeds on the proposition that the answer is the Jamat.

⸻

9. THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF

The same principle applies to the Ismaili Constitution.

The Constitution is not simply an ordinary institutional publication.

It establishes the framework within which the Jamat and its institutions operate and is therefore inherently connected to the rights, responsibilities and governance of the Jamat.

The 2025 Constitution contains provisions concerning dissemination and intellectual property. Those provisions should be read in their constitutional context.

Where the Constitution provides for its availability to murids and requires it to be read together with Farmans, its dissemination should not be interpreted in a manner that defeats the purpose for which the Constitution exists.

The Constitution governs the Jamat. The Jamat must therefore be able to know the Constitution that governs it.

⸻

10. DISSEMINATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

The 2025 Constitution addresses the manner in which constitutional materials are to be disseminated, including requirements relating to dignity and intellectual property.

Protecting intellectual property may be legitimate where the objective is to prevent:

* unauthorised commercial exploitation;
* distortion or alteration;
* misleading reproduction;
* advertising or propaganda;
* unauthorised commercial publication; or
* other uses inconsistent with constitutional requirements.

Those objectives do not necessarily require restricting ordinary religious or educational access by members of the Jamat.

There is therefore a distinction between:

protecting the integrity and authorised use of a publication

and

preventing the Jamat from receiving the underlying guidance.

The former may be a legitimate institutional function.

The latter requires a separate and specific justification.

⸻

11. AN INSTITUTIONAL RECORDING REMAINS A RECORDING OF THE FARMAN

If an institution records a Farman, the recording may be protected as a particular recording.

But the existence of copyright in the recording does not change the nature of what was recorded.

It remains a recording of the Farman.

Similarly:

* a transcript remains a transcript of the Farman;
* a translation remains a translation of the Farman;
* a publication remains a publication communicating the Farman; and
* a digital file remains a medium through which the Farman is communicated.

The institutional work may therefore attract its own intellectual-property rights without transforming the underlying Farman into an institutional asset that can automatically be withheld from the Jamat.

⸻

12. THE QUESTION OF EXPRESS DIRECTION FROM THE IMAM

This leads to a central constitutional question.

If a Farman is given to the Jamat, and an institution is responsible for recording or disseminating it, what authority would allow the institution to decide independently that the Jamat should not receive it?

The proposition advanced by this paper is that institutional policy or copyright ownership should not, by itself, be treated as equivalent to an express direction from Mawlana Hazar Imam.

If Mawlana Hazar Imam specifically directs that particular material is confidential, restricted or not to be disseminated, that is a different matter.

An express and specific direction from the Imam would establish the relevant restriction.

But in the absence of such a direction, an institution should not create a restriction simply by asserting ownership over the medium through which the guidance has been communicated.

⸻

13. COPYRIGHT SHOULD NOT DEFEAT THE PURPOSE OF DISSEMINATION

The underlying constitutional logic is straightforward.

If:

1. the Farman is given for the Jamat;
2. the Constitution governs the Jamat;
3. the institutions exist to serve the Jamat; and
4. the institution is entrusted with recording, publishing or disseminating the material,

then the ordinary consequence should be access by the Jamat.

Copyright should protect legitimate rights in the work through which the guidance is communicated.

It should not become a mechanism through which the Jamat is denied access to the guidance itself.

An institution should not be able to use a right created to protect dissemination as a reason to prevent dissemination to the very community it exists to serve.

⸻

14. CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LITIGATION

The Canadian litigation concerning publication and distribution of material associated with the Aga Khan provides an important legal context.

The proceedings demonstrate that copyright law can apply to materials associated with the Imam and that courts may consider questions concerning authorship, ownership, publication and infringement.

However, a copyright judgment concerning particular works, parties and evidence should not automatically be treated as resolving the separate constitutional question addressed in this paper:

What is the relationship between institutional copyright in a particular medium and the Jamat’s access to the underlying Farman or constitutional guidance?

That question requires examination of the relevant constitutional provisions, institutional mandate and specific nature of the material concerned.

⸻

15. WHAT THE CANADIAN CASE DOES NOT NECESSARILY ESTABLISH

A finding that copyright exists in a particular recording, publication or other work does not necessarily establish that:

* the underlying Farman is an ordinary institutional asset;
* the institution has an unrestricted right to withhold the Farman from the Jamat;
* members of the Jamat have no right to receive the guidance;
* an institutional copyright notice is equivalent to an express Farman restricting dissemination; or
* the constitutional purpose of dissemination is subordinate to institutional ownership of a particular medium.

These are separate questions.

Any reliance upon copyright litigation should therefore be carefully confined to what the court actually decided.

⸻

16. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MEDIUM AND MESSAGE

The distinction is particularly important in an age of digital communication.

The same Farman may exist simultaneously as:

* an original audio recording;
* a video recording;
* a transcript;
* a translation;
* a printed publication;
* a digital file;
* an educational resource; and
* a quotation or extract used for religious study.

Each medium may raise different copyright questions.

But the existence of multiple media does not create multiple Farmans.

There remains an underlying message or guidance conveyed by Mawlana Hazar Imam.

The constitutional question is therefore not simply:

“Who owns this file?”

It is also:

“What is the institutional responsibility toward the Jamat concerning the guidance contained in that file?”

⸻

17. ISLAMIC PUBLICATIONS LIMITED (IPL)

Islamic Publications Limited has an important role in the publication and distribution of Ismaili materials.

Published materials have carried copyright notices and references to publication under licence.

Such arrangements may have legitimate legal and commercial purposes and may establish rights concerning particular editions, publications, translations, compilations or other forms of presentation.

However, the existence of such rights does not by itself answer the constitutional question examined here.

The question remains whether an institutional publication right can properly be relied upon to prevent members of the Jamat from receiving the underlying Farman or Constitution.

That question should be considered by reference to:

* the Constitution;
* the relevant Farman;
* the institutional mandate;
* the nature of the particular material;
* the scope of the asserted intellectual-property right; and
* any express direction concerning restriction or dissemination.

⸻

18. COPYRIGHT NOTICES AND EXCLUSIVE LICENCES

Where a publication states that copyright is held by or on behalf of a particular rights holder and that the publication is issued under an exclusive licence, the notice should be understood in its proper legal context.

It may establish rights in the particular publication.

It does not necessarily establish that the underlying Farman itself has become an ordinary commercial work owned by the publisher.

Nor should an exclusive licence automatically be interpreted as a constitutional direction that the Jamat may not access the underlying guidance.

A licence governing publication and distribution is therefore not necessarily the same thing as a direction from Mawlana Hazar Imam restricting access by the Jamat.

⸻

19. PROTECTION OF AUTHENTICITY VERSUS CONTROL OF ACCESS

There is a legitimate institutional interest in protecting the authenticity and integrity of Farmans.

Uncontrolled reproduction may create risks of:

* alteration;
* mistranslation;
* incomplete quotation;
* misrepresentation;
* commercial exploitation; or
* attribution of material to the Imam that is not authentic.

Those concerns can justify appropriate controls over authorised versions and the manner in which materials are reproduced.

But there is an important distinction between controlling authenticity and controlling access.

The two should not automatically be treated as the same thing.

An institution may provide an authorised version while still allowing members of the Jamat to receive, preserve and study that material for religious and educational purposes.

⸻

20. THE PURPOSE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Intellectual-property law protects particular forms of creative expression and the legitimate interests associated with them.

It should therefore be applied with precision.

Where a recording, translation, compilation or publication contains a Farman, the relevant question is what intellectual creation belongs to the particular work and what rights arise from it.

The existence of those rights should not automatically be expanded into a general right to control the underlying religious guidance.

In constitutional terms, the institution may administer the means of dissemination without thereby acquiring a proprietary right to the guidance being disseminated.

⸻

21. FARMANS AND THE RIGHTS OF THE JAMAT

The Jamat is not merely the audience for the Constitution and Farmans.

The Jamat is the community for whose benefit the constitutional framework exists.

Members therefore have a direct religious and educational interest in being able to:

* know the Constitution;
* receive Farmans;
* study Farmans;
* preserve Farmans;
* understand the guidance of the Imam;
* teach and discuss that guidance; and
* understand the constitutional rights and responsibilities governing the community.

This is particularly important where the Constitution itself is intended to be read together with Farmans.

A constitutional framework cannot operate effectively if the people governed by it cannot access the governing document or the authoritative guidance with which it must be read.

⸻

22. QUESTIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CLARIFICATION

The issue therefore warrants clear institutional clarification.

1. Farmans

What is the precise constitutional and intellectual-property status of a Farman itself, as distinguished from the recording, transcript, translation or publication through which it is communicated?

2. Recordings

Where an institution records a Farman, what rights does the institution hold in the recording, and do those rights extend beyond that particular recording?

3. Publications

Where a Farman is published, what rights arise in the publication, and how are those rights distinguished from the underlying Farman?

4. Access by the Jamat

Does institutional copyright or licensing restrict a murid from receiving, preserving, studying or sharing an authentic Farman for religious, educational and non-commercial purposes?

5. Express directions

Where dissemination is restricted, is that restriction based upon an express and specific direction of Mawlana Hazar Imam, or upon an institutional copyright or publication policy?

6. The Constitution

What is the precise scope of intellectual-property rights concerning the Constitution itself, and how do those rights operate alongside the constitutional requirement that the Constitution be available to murids?

7. Institutional mandate

How should institutional intellectual-property rights be understood in light of the fact that the institutions exist to serve the Jamat?

⸻

23. WHY THIS MATTERS TODAY

These questions are increasingly important because Farmans and constitutional materials are now communicated through many forms of technology.

A Farman may be:

* recorded on a telephone;
* streamed online;
* circulated digitally;
* transcribed;
* translated;
* stored in a digital archive;
* reproduced in educational materials; or
* shared among members of the Jamat.

The technology may change.

The constitutional relationship does not.

The fundamental question remains whether the Jamat can access the guidance given for the Jamat.

This is therefore not simply a historical copyright issue.

It is a contemporary constitutional and institutional question.

⸻

24. THE PRINCIPLE OF STEWARDSHIP

The institutional role may appropriately be understood as one of stewardship.

Institutions entrusted with the recording, preservation and dissemination of Farmans have an important responsibility to ensure:

* authenticity;
* accuracy;
* dignity;
* preservation;
* accessibility;
* proper attribution; and
* appropriate use.

Those responsibilities are compatible with intellectual-property protection.

Indeed, appropriate intellectual-property protection can assist institutions in protecting the integrity of authorised materials.

But stewardship is different from ownership in the sense of an unrestricted power to withhold.

The institution holds responsibility for the means through which the guidance reaches the Jamat; that responsibility should not become a barrier preventing the Jamat from receiving the guidance.

⸻

25. THE CONSTITUTION AS A COMMON FRAMEWORK

The Constitution provides a common framework for:

* the Imam;
* the Imamat;
* the Jamat;
* the institutions; and
* the governance structures through which the community is served.

These should not be viewed as competing legal interests.

They form part of one constitutional order.

The Constitution therefore provides the framework through which institutional authority must be understood.

If an institutional practice produces an outcome in which the Jamat cannot access the very Constitution or Farmans that govern and guide it, that practice warrants examination against the purpose and structure of the Constitution itself.

⸻

26. PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE

For purposes of further discussion, this briefing proposes:

Where Mawlana Hazar Imam gives a Farman to the Jamat, the Farman is given for the guidance and benefit of the Jamat. Where constitutional institutions record, publish, translate, reproduce, preserve or disseminate that Farman, they do so within their mandate to serve the Jamat. Intellectual-property rights in the particular medium through which the Farman is communicated should protect legitimate institutional interests but should not, in the absence of an express and specific direction from Mawlana Hazar Imam, be used to withhold the underlying Farman from the Jamat.

The same principle should apply to the Constitution itself.

⸻

27. CENTRAL PRINCIPLE FOR FURTHER STUDY

The central proposition can therefore be stated in its simplest form:

The Farmans are for the Jamat. The Constitution is for the Jamat. The institutions exist to serve the Jamat. Accordingly, the Farmans and Constitution should be available to every member of the Jamat, unless Mawlana Hazar Imam has expressly and specifically directed that particular material is to be withheld or restricted.

This proposition does not deny legitimate copyright.

It places copyright within the constitutional context in which the relevant material exists.

⸻

28. CONCLUSION

This briefing concludes that the starting point for understanding Farmans, the Constitution and intellectual-property rights must be the constitutional relationship between Mawlana Hazar Imam, the Jamat and the institutions established to serve the Jamat.

The Farman is given by Mawlana Hazar Imam for the guidance and benefit of the Jamat.

The Constitution is likewise established for the governance, guidance and benefit of the Jamat.

The institutions established under the constitutional framework exist to serve that Jamat and act within that mandate.

They are not independent of the Jamat or established for a purpose separate from it; they form part of the same constitutional community, in which the Jamat and its institutions are connected through the Constitution and the authority of the Imam.

Consequently, every member of the Jamat should be able to receive the Farmans and the Constitution that govern and guide the Jamat.

Where an institution produces or controls a recording, publication, translation, compilation, edition or other medium through which a Farman or the Constitution is communicated, any intellectual-property rights in that medium should be understood and exercised within the institution’s mandate to serve the Jamat.

This does not mean that legitimate intellectual-property rights in a particular recording, publication, translation, design or compilation have no purpose. They may protect the integrity, authenticity, presentation and authorised use of the particular medium.

But ownership or administration of the medium should not be converted into a right to withhold the underlying Farman or Constitution from the community for whose benefit it exists.

The central principle is therefore straightforward:

The Farmans are for the Jamat. The Constitution is for the Jamat. The institutions exist to serve the Jamat. Accordingly, the Farmans and Constitution should be available to every member of the Jamat, unless Mawlana Hazar Imam has expressly and specifically directed that particular material is to be withheld or restricted.

This is the essential distinction between protecting intellectual property in the means of communication and withholding the substance of the guidance itself.

The former may have a legitimate institutional purpose.

The latter should not arise merely because an institution holds or administers rights in the medium through which the Imam’s guidance has been communicated.

The institution may administer the means of dissemination; it should not thereby acquire the right to prevent the Jamat from receiving the guidance that the institution exists to serve.

The issue is therefore not whether institutions should have legitimate intellectual-property rights.

They may.

The issue is whether those rights should ever be interpreted so broadly that the Jamat is prevented from receiving the Farmans and Constitution intended for the Jamat.

This briefing concludes that the constitutional presumption should be access, availability and dissemination to the Jamat, subject to any express and specific direction from Mawlana Hazar Imam and applicable law.

⸻

APPENDIX A

ORIGINAL SUBMISSION — 13 JUNE 2026

The original submission concerned the relationship between the 2025 Ismaili Constitution, Farmans, copyright and intellectual-property rights.

It sought clarification concerning:

1. the relationship between constitutional provisions concerning dissemination and copyright notices;
2. the nature and scope of intellectual-property rights applied to Farmans and doctrinal texts;
3. the distinction between spiritual guidance and publication rights;
4. institutional licensing arrangements;
5. the role of Islamic Publications Limited and other institutional publishers; and
6. the rights and access of members of the Jamat.

The submission was expressly intended as an educational and constructive request for:

“guidance, clarification, annotations, corrections, or observations that may assist in improving the accuracy of this study.”

As of 26 September 2026, no substantive response to the study has been received.

This Appendix is included for transparency and to preserve the chronology of the inquiry. It is not intended as criticism of any individual or institution.

⸻

APPENDIX B

MATTERS REQUIRING DOCUMENTARY AND LEGAL VERIFICATION

The following matters should, where possible, be supported by primary documentary sources in any final legal submission:

1. The complete text of the 2025 Ismaili Constitution, including relevant Rules, Regulations and policies.
2. The constitutional provisions concerning dissemination and intellectual property.
3. The precise copyright notices appearing on relevant Farman publications.
4. The terms of licences under which Farmans are published.
5. Corporate and ownership information relating to Islamic Publications Limited.
6. Relevant UK, Canadian and other intellectual-property registrations.
7. The pleadings, judgments and orders in relevant Canadian litigation.
8. Any specific Farman concerning confidentiality, restricted dissemination or intellectual-property rights.
9. Any institutional policy governing access to Farmans and constitutional materials.
10. Historical arrangements through which Farmans were recorded, preserved and disseminated to the Jamat.

Primary documents should take precedence over secondary descriptions wherever available.

⸻

APPENDIX C

SUGGESTED TERMINOLOGY

Farman
The pronouncement, direction, order or ruling made or given by Mawlana Hazar Imam.

Recording
The particular audio, video or other recording through which a Farman is captured.

Transcript
The written rendering of a recorded Farman.

Translation
A rendering of the Farman into another language.

Publication
A particular printed, digital or other edition through which the Farman is communicated.

Compilation
A collection or arrangement of Farmans or other materials.

Intellectual property
Legal rights that may arise in particular creative works, recordings, publications, translations, compilations, designs or other protected material.

Underlying Farman
The substantive pronouncement, direction, order or ruling of Mawlana Hazar Imam, distinguished from the particular medium through which it is communicated.

This terminology is intended to preserve the important distinction between the guidance itself and the means by which the guidance is communicated.

⸻

APPENDIX D

PRINCIPAL LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES

Constitutional and Institutional Material

* Ismaili Constitution 2025
* Earlier Ismaili Constitution
* Institute of Ismaili Studies
* ITREB
* Islamic Publications Limited
* Ismaili Imamat

Canadian Copyright Litigation

Aga Khan v. Tajdin et al.

The Canadian litigation forms part of the relevant legal history concerning copyright and material associated with the Aga Khan. Any reference to the litigation should be based on the actual judgments, orders and procedural history rather than secondary descriptions.

Copyright Law

* UK Intellectual Property Office — Copyright
* Canadian Intellectual Property Office — Copyright

Primary legislation, court judgments, constitutional documents and official corporate records should be preferred wherever available.

⸻

APPENDIX E

FINAL STATEMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PURPOSE

This briefing paper is intended to facilitate informed understanding of the 2025 Ismaili Constitution and its relationship with Farmans, institutional responsibilities and intellectual-property law.

It does not seek to diminish the role of institutions or the legitimate protection of intellectual property.

Rather, it asks that institutional rights be understood within the constitutional purpose for which the institutions exist.

The fundamental proposition remains:

The Jamat is the beneficiary. The institutions are established to serve the Jamat. The Farmans and Constitution are given for the Jamat. Therefore, the ordinary constitutional expectation should be that every member of the Jamat can receive, preserve, study and understand them, unless Mawlana Hazar Imam has expressly and specifically directed otherwise.

The essential distinction is therefore between:

the Farman or Constitution itself

and

the recording, publication, translation, compilation, design or other medium through which it is communicated.

Where an institution records, publishes, preserves or distributes a Farman or the Constitution pursuant to its institutional mandate, it does so for the benefit of the Jamat.

Accordingly, this study advances the proposition that an institutional claim of copyright or intellectual property in the particular medium should not, without clear and specific authority from Mawlana Hazar Imam, be interpreted as giving the institution a right to prevent the Jamat from receiving, preserving, studying or sharing the underlying Farman or Constitution for legitimate religious, educational and non-commercial purposes.

The institution may administer the means of dissemination; it should not thereby become the owner of the guidance to be and being disseminated to the Jamat.

⸻

END OF UPDATED EDUCATIONAL BRIEFING

26 September 2026
Post Reply